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THE STEEL TRIGGER PRICE
MECHANISM
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the American steel industry has been con-
fronted with slack demand during a period of expanding excess o
worldwide production capacity. The relative obsolescence of
American plants and equipment has hampered efforts by the do-
mestic industry to compete in this environment, and many for-
eign producers have been able to undersell American companies
in the domestic market even after including reasonable profits
and the cost of transportation. Domestic industry leaders con-
tend, however, that much of the imported steel has been
"dumped"-that is, sold at less than fair value-by less efficient
foreign producers attempting to maintain high rates of plant
utilization in order to minimize unemployment and help cover
fixed operating costs.1 Dumping is proscribed by statute in the
United States2 and internationally by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade,$ to which all of the major trading partners of
the United States subscribe.4 As steel industry leaders at-
tempted to counter the alleged dumping by foreign producers,
they found existing antidumping procedures ineffective, cumber-
some, time consuming, and easily circumvented. In response to
criticism from the steel industry, the federal government estab-
lished the trigger price mechanism (TPM) in January 1978.
Steel imported into the United States at prices lower than speci-
fied trigger prices would result in a self-initiated government an-
tidumping investigation that was predicted to reduce the time
necessary to complete action from the usual thirteen-month pe-
1. See Steel: Protection Now, Rundown Later, THE ECONoMisT, Dec. 31, 1977, at 78.
2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976).
3. 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947).
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is "a multilateral interna-
tional agreement which is today the principal instrument for the regulation of world
trade. Over eighty nations, including the United States, participate in GATT and it has
been estimated that about eighty percent of world trade is governed by this agreement."
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law,
66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 250 (1967).
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riod to between two and three months.5 Trigger prices were to
be revised quarterly to reflect intervening changes in costs of
production components and currency values.
In March 1980, the Commerce Department announced that
it would not increase steel trigger prices for the next quarter.
The United States Steel Corporation retaliated by flooding the
Department with antidumping petitions against European pro-
'ducers, alleging that these producers had dumped steel products
in the United States. The Commerce Department immediately
suspended the TPM,7 purportedly in order to process the large
number of complaints. After months of consultation between all
of the interested parties, the Carter Administration announced
that the TPM would be reinstated for five years" and that
United States Steel would withdraw its complaints.9 The an-
nouncement emphasized that the TPM was to be temporary and
only one part of an overall program designed to facilitate the
modernization of the American steel industry and make it a suc-
cessful competitor of efficient foreign producers in a free trade
environment.1"
Because the reintroduced TPM is intended to be a tempo-
rary program, it is appropriate to examine the progress of the
steel industry in the recent past to determine whether tempo-
rary assistance, limited to five years, is likely to be effective.
This Note will examine the background of the steel industry and
antidumping legislation in the United States; the establishment,
theory, and legal basis of the TPM; the crisis precipitated by
United States Steel; and the potential effects of the resulting
settlement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Steel Industry
Historically, the American steel industry has enjoyed cer-
5. Interagency Task Force, Report to the President: A Comprehensive Program for
the Steel Industry, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATs. 955, 967-68 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Solo-
mon Report].
6, Id. at 966.
7. THE EcoNoMisT, Mar. 29, 1980, at 105.
8. [1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 46, at N-5 (Oct. 1, 1980).
9. Id. at A-14.
10. Id. at N-2.
[Vol. 33
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tain advantages including ample supplies of raw materials in
proximity to low-cost water transportation routes, inexpensive
immigrant labor, and a continent-sized domestic market free
from trade barriers and foreign competition., Given this gener-
ally favorable environment, the industry prospered until the
mid-1950s 12 and developed at least two characteristics that were
unusual in American business. First, the steel industry was an-
ticompetitive in terms of price; and second, the industry's major
producers did not attempt to capture the entire market.18
Big steel's apparently conscious effort to avoid control of an
excessive share of the market and its willingness to learn from
the experience of other industries may explain why steel indus-
try practices that seem to violate federal antitrust laws have not
been successfully challenged. That United States Steel and other
steel companies practiced serious anticompetitive price-fixing
during United States Steel's early years is beyond dispute.14 In
1911, similar practices by American Tobacco and Standard Oil
were the basis for antitrust actions that resulted in divestiture
orders against both companies. In the same year, an antitrust
suit was also instituted against United States Steel, but a num-
ber of events-including World War I-delayed a decision on
the case until 1920. During the delay, the steel industry's signifi-
cant role in the war effort and its adjustment of the more obvi-
ous methods of price collusion favorably affected public opinion.
United States v. United States Steel Corporation,5 a four-
three decision by the United States Supreme Court recognized
the corporation's past sins but concluded that, because the com-
pany had recently mended its ways, it should not be convicted of
11. A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, § 4.2, at 145-46
(1979).
12. For an analysis of United States Steel's failure to capture a larger share of the
market, see W. ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 150-52 (3d ed. 1961).
13. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 11, at 146-48. See W. ADAMS, supra, note 12, at 150-
52. Judge Gary, United States Steel's chief executive, was apparently influenced by the
claims of William Jennings Bryan that no business should be allowed to control more
than fifty percent of an industry. "Gary felt that if U.S. Steel confined itself 'voluntarily
to a size approved by the most popular and trusted of radicals, [it] surely cannot be
attacked for monopoly."' Id. at 150-51 (quoting I. TAx.BzLL, THE LIFE OF ELBERT H.
GARY 257-58 (1930)).
14. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 438-45 (1920).
15. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
1982]
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antitrust violations.16
After this decision, which exemplifies the special treatment
given the American steel industry as a whole, the industry en-
joyed a long period of protectionist tariffs and government toler-
ance of anticompetitive pricing policies. This period continued
until after World War II. During the postwar period, however,
the United States took the lead in negotiations to decrease trade
barriers. The threat posed by free trade was probably not imme-
diately apparent to American steel executives whose industry
had survived the war unscathed while most foreign steel indus-
tries had been devastated. Moreover, the domestic steel indus-
try, which was operating at full capacity in modern plants,17 was
called upon to supply steel to rebuild the rest of the industrial-
ized world. By the 1950s, however, a coincidence of newly rebuilt
and efficient foreign steel industries, continued reductions in
tariff protection, and the obsolescence of American plants built
during the war began to weaken the domestic industry's compet-
itive position.'
The United States was a net exporter of steel until 1959,9
when a 116-day strike forced domestic steel users to import large
amounts of foreign steel, which they found satisfactory in quali-
ty and reliability and competitive in price. For the first time
both industry leaders" and domestic steel users recognized the
growing potential of foreign producers to compete in the Ameri-
can market. Since then, the United States has been a net im-
porter of steel with imports at times approaching twenty percent
of domestic steel use.2
The steel industry has not yet adjusted fully to its new envi-
ronment. Its progress toward modernization has not been ia-
16. Id. at 457.
17. The United States Government acquired over one billion dollars worth of steel
plants during the war. Most of these plants were managed for the government by the
large steel companies and after the war were sold to their wartime managers at consider-
able discounts. For example, one plant that had cost the government $202 million to
build was sold to United States Steel for $47 million. W. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 152-
53.
18. See generally K. WARREN, WORK STEEL: AN ECONoMIc GEOGRAPHY 217-28
(1975); 5 W. HOGAN, ECONoMIc HISTORY OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES 2033.80 (1971).
19. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 11, at 148.
20. Id. at 212-13; THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1980, at 106.
[Vol. 33
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pressive,21 and it is still attempting to invoke protective mea-
sures to block imports.22 This indictment is not intended to
suggest that the industry has made no effort to meet the chal-
lenge of efficient foreign competition or that the industry has
not been subjected to significant external problems.2 3 It does,
21. [A]ccording to the International Iron and Steel Institute, 81 percent of Ja-
pan's crude steel in 1976 was produced in efficient basic oxygen furnaces com-
pared with only 63 percent of U.S. output. By contrast, higher-cost open
hearth furnaces accounted for 18 percent of U.S. crude steel production, but
for only 0.5 percent in Japan. Moreover, 35 percent of Japanese steel was pro-
duced by the labor-saving [and energy-saving] continuous casting method,
more than triple the 11 percent in the United States. Also, the Japanese ap-
pear to benefit from economies of scale by using giant blast furnaces to an
extent unparalleled in the American steel industry (Wall Street Journal, 3 Au-
Igust 1977).
Adams, Unfair Competition in International Trade, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS, AND TRADE:
THE POLITICS OF PROTECTIONISM 107 (1979). It has been estimated that by 1988 the
American industry could achieve fifty percent of its output by continuous casting. The
Japanese industry predicts it will achieve ninety percent by 1984. THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
4, 1980, at 71.
22. Initial attempts by the industry to counter serious foreign competition were
based on the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-64, 170a (1976), and the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1872, 1981 (1976). The standards of these
acts were too stringent, however, to permit a finding of import-caused injury. When ex-
isting measures proved inadequate, the industry engaged in intensive lobbying for legis-
lative imposition of quota protection, which resulted in a number of bills that began to
surface as early as 1967. In order to avoid adverse international ramifications, which were
to be expected if mandatory quotas were imposed, the State Department persuaded ma-
jor foreign steehnakers to enter into voluntary restraint agreements (VRA). Japan and
the European Community both agreed to three-year VRAs that became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1969. Slightly modified agreements were negotiated for three years following the
initial VRAs, so that some form of voluntary quota was in effect to protect the steel
industry from European and Japanese imports from 1969-1975. The TPM was initially
implemented in January 1978 after announcement by major steelmakers in the summer
of 1977 that it would be forced to close major plants and lay off substantial numbers of
employees. Adams, Unfair Competition, supra note 21, at 97-106.
23. The steel industry faced both international and domestic problems that may
have prevented its complete modernization. International developments included a
steadily increasing world production capacity coupled with a leveling of demand. Tan
ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 1980 at 72. The Japanese industry progressed rapidly throughout
the period to become the largest steel exporter in the world, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 31,
1977 at 79-80, able to produce steel so efficiently that it could compete at American
prices at a time when American industry would have preferred to finance new plants
through increased prices. During the same period, the European Community experienced
significant slumps in demand and was willing to sell at reduced prices in the American
market in order to use excess capacity and maintain employment levels in its own indus-
try-effectively exporting unemployment to the United States. Finally, in the 1970s,
OPEC raised oil prices and for the first time energy costs became a significant part of
production costs in what was once a very capital intensive industry. THE ECONOMIST,
5
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however, raise questions about the industry's commitment to
modernization and its ability to achieve significant results within
the five-year life of the reinstated TPM.
B. Antidumping Legislation
1. Development in the United States.-Dumping occurs
when a foreign manufacturer exports goods to be sold in the
United States at a lower price than that charged in his own
country.24 As defined by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,25
dumping is the sale of foreign goods at less than their fair
value.28 Dumping is generally advantageous to foreign manufac-
turers who benefit from increased sales, greater market domina-
tion, higher profits, and higher employment. It might also be
considered beneficial by American consumers because it results
in lower prices. Consumers in the producing country, however,
might view dumping as harmful on the theory that it results in
higher than normal prices for products sold at home, since goods
dumped in the United States do not carry a proportionate share
Apr. 12, 1980, at 72.
Domestically, the industry was faced with slowing demand as lighter metals and
other substitutes were used in finished products; labor costs increased faster than pro-
ductivity and far exceeded those of foreign competitors ("Wages and benefits of Ameri-
can steelworkers average $18.90 an hour compared with $9.20 an hour for their Japanese
counterparts .... NEwswEEK, Oct. 13, 1980, at 90); government regulations on environ-
mental standards and safety required large expenditures (estimated at $6 billion for en-
vironmental standards from 1977 to 1983, Solomon Report, supra note 9, at 971); and
social and administrative pressures were applied to keep inefficient eastern plants open
and prevent relocating to higher demand areas in the west. Additionally, the industry
was in poor financial condition to raise the capital needed to fund needed improvements,
long-term debt was at its practical limit, and book value of equities significantly ex-
ceeded market price. Finally, funds that could be raised were effectively diminished by
the effects of runaway inflation.
24. Alternatively, dumping may be defined using the price charged in a third coun-
try if insufficient market data is available on the producing country from which to figure
fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (Supp. 1979). If sales to a third country were made, fair
value may be computed using cost of production plus reasonable markup for cost of sales
and profits. An even more difficult question arises when dealing with a state-controlled
economy producing a product only for sale in the United States. Electric Golf Cars from
Poland, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5116 (1975). See also Electric Golf Cars from
Poland, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5117 (1975); Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 1
INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5511 (1980).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)(codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
26. Id.
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of the cost of production. Both American steel producers and
American labor may be harmed by increased competition result-
ing from the sale of imported steel at less than fair value. It is
this potential harm to American industry that antidumping laws
are intended to prevent.
Present antidumping procedures were first enacted by Con-
gress as part of the Antidumping Act of 1921,28 which was in-
tended "to protect American industries from the detrimental ef-
fects of importation of foreign goods at unfairly low prices."29
The 1921 Act~provided for imposition of a special dumping duty
(equal to the excess of market value in the producing country
over the exporter's sale price)30 upon Treasury Department find-
ings that imports were sold at less than fair value and that the
domestic industry had been or was likely to be injured. 1
One of the major deficiencies in the 1921 Act was its failure
to place time constraints on government processing of com-
plaints. As a result, when resolution of a complaint involved sen-
sitive international political issues, the Treasury Department
could simply postpone a decision for an indefinite period of
time.2 The Trade Act of 197433 solved this problem by estab-
lishing time limits for the completion of antidumping investiga-
27. Dumping can result in lower costs to consumers in the producing country. To
the extent that the goods are produced using excess capacity and the price received ex-
ceeds the variable costs of production, a contribution is made to cover fixed costs, and
lower domestic prices become possible.
28. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976). The 1921 Act was repealed by the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 (1979)(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.),
but the basic antidumping theory was reenacted in the new act. Antidumping legislation
had been enacted before the 1921 Act in the Revenue Act of 1916. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
This act provided for criminal actions against importers but was essentially unenforce-
able because it required a showing of intent to destroy or injure a domestic industry. See
id.
29. Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
30. See 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1976).
31. Initially, Treasury made the determination on both dumping and injury. Re-
sponsibility for determination on injury was transferred to the United States Tariff
Commission in 1954. The Tariff Commission was redesignated the International Trade
Commission (ITC) in 1974. See Customs Simplification Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-768 §
301(a), 68 Stat. 1138 (1954)(amending 19 U.S.C. § 160).
32. The pressure for time limits for investigations was even greater because of de-
lays experienced in subsidy/countervailing duty cases. United States Steel filed six such
cases in September 1968, none of which had been acted on six years later. A. LOWENFELD,
supra note 11, at 188-90.
33. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)(codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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tions and also permitted the Treasury to initiate antidumping
investigations without waiting for a private company to petition
for an investigation. 4
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979'5 was enacted to imple-
ment trade agreements negotiated and signed by the United
States in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Although the 1979 Act repealed the 1921 Act, it retained the ba-
sic antidumping procedures of the 1921 Act but reduced time
limits for conducting investigations36 and adopted a standard
that requires a showing of material injury before antidumping
duties can be assessed.
37
2. Antidumping Procedures.-As enacted in the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, current antidumping procedures pro-
vide that once an antidumping petition has been filed by an
American manufacturer or other interested and allegedly injured
party, concurrent investigations are conducted by the Commerce
Department" and the International Trade Commission."e Com-
merce is responsible for determining whether a foreign producer
34. Id. at § 321, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). The latter provision was not used by Trea-
sury, but the authority of Treasury to initiate an investigation without any prior indus-
try complaint was cited as authority under which the Executive Branch could implement
trigger prices for steel products without Congressional approval. Solomon Report, supra
note 5, at 965-66.
35. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)(codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b) (Supp. 1979).
37. Id. The 1921 Act required only injury or likelihood of injury. 19 U.S.C. § 160
(1976)(repealed 1979). For a general discussion of the material injury standard, see Note,
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Material Injury Standard, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
87 (1979). Much of the impetus for adoption of a material injury standard came from
foreign trading partners who considered the standard applied by the United States to be
defined in Article VI of the GATT. 61 Stat. A3, A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 28 (1947); and
in the International Dumping Code, Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of the
GATT (1967)(entered into force for the United States, July 1, 1968). See generally
Didier, EEC Antidumping Rules and Practices, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 349, 359-60
(1980); Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 327, 378-79 (1975). For a suggestion that, even with the new material injury
language, the ITC will continue to apply a de minimis standard, see Alberger, Implemen-
tation of the New Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws by the U.S.I.T.C., in
BASICS OF ANTIDUMPING AND OTHER IMPORT RELIEF LAWS MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS UPDATE 151 (1979)(Alberger is now Chairman of the ITC).
38. Pursuant to the President's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.
69,273 (1979), authority to administer antidumping law was transferred to the Secretary
of Commerce on Jan. 2, 1980.
39. See note 30 supra.
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has engaged in dumping, and the Trade Commission is charged
with determining whether a domestic party or industry has been
or is likely to be injured as a result. The maximum time permit-
ted between the filing of a petition and a final determination is
420 days. Upon an affirmative final determination, Commerce
publishes an antidumping order which describes the merchan-
dise covered and directs the customs service to assess antidump-
ing duties equal to the amount by which the market value of the
foreign merchandise exceeds its price in the United States. 0
The effectiveness of antidumping actions cannot be mea-
sured in terms of the duties that are collected but instead must
be gauged in terms of their potential for discouraging dumping
and for making duties unnecessary. Once Commerce makes an
affirmative preliminary determination and orders a suspension
of liquidation, 1 the most reasonable course of action for the ex-
porter in most cases is either to voluntarily raise his export price
or to stop exporting to the United States. A decision to increase
the export price results in both increased revenue to the ex-
porter on individual sales and increased cost to importers. A de-
cision not to raise the export price, however, also increases cost
to importers because they must either post a bond or pay an
estimated antidumping duty pending assessment. 2 Increased
cost to importers and uncertainty created by suspension of liqui-
dation adversely affect an exporter's level of sales at least as
much as a price increase would because domestic purchasers of
steel frequently suspend their importation of the product from
the challenged source once a suspension of liquidation becomes
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (Supp. 1979). Adjustments are usually necessary to identify
comparable prices with which the size of the antidumping duty may be determined.
Added to the exporter's sales price, for purposes of comparison, are the cost of containers
and covers and other expenses of preparing the product for shipment, import duties re-
bated or not collected by the exporting country by reason of the exportation to the
United States, taxes abated or rebated by the exporting country that would have been
paid but for the exportation to the United States, and the amount of any countervailing
duty imposed by the United States to offset export subsidies. Deducted from the ex-
porter's sales price are costs (including import duties other than countervailing duties)
incident to bringing the merchandise to the place of delivery in the United States and
any export taxes paid to the exporting country (except those to offset subsidies received).
Adjustments are also allowed to reduce the exporter's sales price by the amount, if any,
of sales commissions, some selling expenses, and some processing or assembly costs.
[1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 37, Reference File 37:0103-04.
41. 19 C.F.R. § 353.39(e)(1) (1980).
42. Id. §§ 353.48(a)(3), 353.49(a).
1982] 601
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likely. When importers are faced with the uncertainty not only
of whether an antidumping duty will be assessed but also of the
size of any such duty, they generally find it prudent to buy from
an American producer-or from a foreign producer not charged
with dumping-until the uncertainty is eliminated.
The exporter's best option, assuming a decision to remain in
the United States market, may be a price increase, which elimi-
nates uncertainty and increases his profit margin on whatever
level of sales can be maintained.43 From the viewpoint of the
domestic industry and the United States Government, this re-
sult not only accomplishes the objectives of the Antidumping
Act but also allows early settlement without the expense and
difficulty of a full antidumping investigation.
III. THE TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM
A. The Interagency Task Force
Before enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
several critical conditions had developed in the American steel
industry. The industry claimed that antidumping action-the
primary source of protection against unfair foreign competi-
tion-was cumbersome, burdensome to the domestic producers
it was designed to protect, and easily circumvented by foreign
competitors. In addition, producers had complained that un-
precedented surges of low-priced imports had occurred, a num-
ber of plants had closed, one medium-sized company had en-
tered bankruptcy, unemployment had increased significantly,
and a number of communities were suffering adverse economic
consequences. 44 In 1977, President Carter appointed an Inter-
agency Task Force chaired by Treasury Under Secretary
Anthony B. Solomon to study the state of the industry.
The Task Force reviewed reasons for giving special consid-
43. Significantly, the foreign producer is barred from indemnifying the importer
against any antidumping duty that might be imposed. The amount of any promised re-
imbursement is deducted from the purchase price used to determine the antidumping
duty with the result that, instead of reimbursing the importer, the exporter would be
increasing the potential amount of any antidumping duty to be assessed. 19 C.F.R. §
353.55 (1980).
44. Ehrenhaft, Introductory Note on the United States Department of the Trea-
sury "Trigger Price Mechanism" for Imported Steel Mill Products, 17 I1r'L LEGAL
MATS. 952, 952 (1978).
[Vol. 33
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eration to the steel industry and the purpose and effectiveness of
the Antidumping Act. It then formulated a number of objectives
for a steel recovery program: to assist the steel industry in a
manner that would stimulate efficiency and enable the industry
to compete fairly; to help ease the burden of adjustment to mar-
ket trends for both industry and labor; to provide meaningful
incentives for plant and equipment modernization through ap-
propriate tax, investment, and financial assistance; and to expe-
dite relief from unfair import competition in a manner that
would not preclude healthy competition in the United States
market.45 The Task Force report (Solomon Report) emphasized
that inflationary measures and government involvement in in-
dustry decisions should be avoided.'8
The Task Force found that a global slump in demand com-
bined with substantial excess world capacity had resulted in ag-
gressive exporting by foreign steel producers. As a result, im-
ports were expected to increase from 14.1% of total American
steel consumption in 1976 to 17.9% in 1977.' The domestic
steel industry contended that this increase was largely attributa-
ble to dumping.4 The pendency before the Treasury Depart-
ment of nineteen antidumping petitions concerning steel prod-
ucts underscored the contention that existing procedures were
inadequate to deal with the alleged surge in dumping. Although
the petitions had been filed over a twenty-three month period,
only one had been processed through a preliminary determina-
tion on dumping. The Task Force noted that the average time
required to process a petition was thirteen months-exclusive of
the time required by the manufacturer to prepare the peti-
tion'"-and seemed impressed by a sharp reduction of orders in
one case in which a tentative finding of dumping had been
made.50
The most significant recommendation made by the Task
45. The objectives listed are drawn from a discussion of objectives in the Solomon
"Report, supra note 5, at 960-61.
46. Id. at 961.
47. Id. at 962.
48. Id. at 963.
49. Id. at 964. It has been suggested that the Solomon Report underestimated the
delays in processing petitions. Note, The Trigger Price Mechanism: Does it Prevent
Dumping by Foreign Steelmakers?, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 219, 280 n.11 (1980).
50. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 959.
1982]
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Force was the implementation of the trigger price mechanism:
We recommend that the Department of the Treasury, in ad-
ministering the Antidumping Act, set up a system of trigger
prices, based on the full costs of production including appro-
priate capital charges of steel mill products by the most effi-
cient foreign steel producers (currently the Japanese steel in-
dustry), which would be used as a basis for monitoring imports
of steel into the United States and for initiating accelerated
antidumping investigations with respect to imports priced be-
low the trigger prices.5 1
The TPM, however, was only one element in a comprehensive
program of recommended action designed to achieve the objec-
tives the Task Force had outlined52 and was intended to operate
only until international pricing practices resumed more normal
patterns. Implementation of the full package of recommenda-
tions, however, was necessary to allow the steel industry to take
advantage of the temporary protection afforded by the TPM
and emerge as an efficient and competitive producer in the in-
ternational market. The Treasury Department announced its in-
tention to implement the TPM on December 28, 1977 5 and
published a notice containing the initial trigger prices on Janu-
ary 9, 1978. 54
B. The Theory of the TPM
In simple terms, the TPM was intended to provide for con-
tinuous monitoring of the costs of production, capital, and rea-
sonable profits of the most efficient steel producer, Japan.55 This
cost would be established as the trigger price, and, if any foreign
producer attempted to sell steel in the United States at a price
lower than the trigger price, customs officials would promptly
forward the pertinent information to Treasury for further inves-
tigation. Thus, any producer, regardless of the domestic price of
its product or its costs of production, could sell steel in the
United States at any price greater than or equal to the trigger
51. Id. at 965 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 962.
53. See 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (1977).
54. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1463 (1978).
55. Solomon Report, supra note 4, at 965-66.
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price without risking an investigation. Dumping per se would
not result in an investigation, but sales by a more efficient pro-
ducer whose fair price was below the trigger would result in an
investigation. 57 The Task Force predicted that a formal an-
tidumping investigation could be initiated within a matter of
weeks58 and could be completed within sixty to ninety days.59
C. Challenge to Legality
Shortly after the TPM was established, its legality was chal-
lenged in Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal. The plaintiff, an
independent manufacturer of wire and wire products, claimed
that the TPM "contravenes the Antidumping Act. .., is arbi-
trary and capricious .. ., and is invalid for failure to comply
with rulemaking requirements."61 The plaintiff's primary argu-
ment was that the TPM, by deterring the import of goods below
the trigger price, established a minimum price for the affected
goods and circumvented the procedures of the Antidumping
Act.6 2 The District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed,
however, and held that the TPM was merely a guide for the Sec-
retary of the Treasury in determining whether to exercise his
56. This is true even though individual producers may in some cases be able to show
that their fair price was below the trigger price. See, e.g., [1981] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY A-
14 (BNA) No. 73 (Apr. 15, 1981).
57. This result was justified in terms of injury determination. The Task Force rea-
soned that if the more efficient producers such as Japan had unused efficient capacity, no
injury could be shown by the United States industry from any sales at less than fair
value but above the trigger price. Even if an inefficient producer were prevented from
selling at less than fair value, the efficient producer could expand production and make
the sale in question.
While this feature of the TPM may be subject to criticism as a license to dump for
inefficient producers, it does not appear to be inconsistent with the intent of the An-
tidumping Act.
58. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 967.
59. Id. at 967-68.
60. 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978).
61. Id. at 286. Davis Walker found itself paying higher prices for imported wire rods
it used in producing the wire it sold because wire rods were included in the TPM. Its
foreign competitors, on the other hand, could still get wire rods at a discount and could
undersell Davis Walker in the American market. Because finished wire products were not
included in the TPM, Davis Walker could not even obtain the degree of protection that a
trigger price would have afforded.
62. The provisions in question were those of the original Antidumping Act, 19
U.S.C. 160-171 (1976), which has since been repealed by the Trade Agreements Acts of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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statutory authority to initiate an investigation.13 The court fur-
ther held that "the decision by foreign manufacturers to increase
prices to the trigger price level is not the legal equivalent of the
imposition of dumping duties with respect to all such goods im-
ported at the trigger price level" 64 and granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the government on all claims.
Although the issue was not raised in Davis Walker, the
TPM arguably violates Article XI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 5 to the extent that it establishes a de facto
minimum price system or other nontariff deterrent to free trade.
Article XI, which has the effect of domestic law insofar as it
does not conflict with other federal legislation, 8 provides that
"[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other .charges . . .shall be instituted or maintained by the con-
tracting party .... "87 The plaintiff in Davis Walker argued
that the TPM circumvented the Antidumping Act by establish-
ing a minimum price system,8 and the district court found that
the TPM did not "by its terms" preclude importation of goods
at less than trigger prices.8 9 The court thus concluded that the
TPM did not create a de jure minimum price and that it fur-
thered the intent of the Antidumping Act by protecting domes-
tic industries from unfair foreign competition. Not closely con-
63, Id. at 292-93.
64. Id. at 292.
65. 61 Stat. A3, A32, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 28 (1947).
66. [C]ourt cases, insofar as they deal explicitly with the subject, have hereto-
fore treated the GATT as direct domestic law of the United States. All the
general clauses, except Part IV . . ., have been proclaimed by the Presi-
dent .... Consequently, those parts proclaimed should be considered domes-
tic law in the same manner as a regulation issued pursuant to authority dele-
gated in a statute.
Since the Presidential proclamation of GATT also proclaimed the Protocol
of Provisional Application and applied GATT to the extent of that Protocol, it
is clear that Part II of GATT [including Art XI] is applied on "to the fullest
extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." As domestic law, GATT pro-
visions can be overruled by subsequent legislation.
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in A LAWYER's GUEDE TO INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 45 (2d ed. part I, 1977). For a detailed analysis of
GATT and United States law, see Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967).
67. GATT, Art. XI, 61 Stat. A3, A32, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 28 (1947).
68. 460 F. Supp. at 289.
69. Id. at 292 (emphasis in original).
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sidered, however, was the question of whether the TPM created
a de facto minimum price. Article XI is designed to prevent
nontariff trade barriers, whether de jure or de facto, and a
strong argument can be made that the TPM creates a barrier of
the latter type. This analysis might well have supported an in-
junction against Treasury in Davis Walker.
The TPM also raises a procedural question. Current an-
tidumping provisions charge the International Trade Commis-
sion, an agency separate from the Commerce Department,0 with
responsibility for determining injury but allocate to Commerce
the responsibility for determining whether dumping has oc-
curred. The TPM, however, permits the Commerce Department
not only to determine whether a finding that dumping has oc-
curred is probable but also to presuppose, in making that deter-
mination, the result of an ITC investigation on injury. Although
this appears to be the effect of the TPM, a challenge to the le-
gality of TPM on these grounds would probably be unsuccessful.
In theory, the full range of procedures established by antidump-
ing legislation protects manufacturers from injury, and they re-
tain the right to file an antidumping petition in their own be-
half. In fact, however, as suggested by the Solomon Report, the
TPM may make it difficult for domestic producers to prove in-
jury from sales above the trigger price.7 1 Also, as noted earlier,
the traditional remedies can only be used at the risk of suspen-
sion of the TPM.
7 2
D. The TPM Before March 1980
The initial reaction to the TPM by all parties directly con-
cerned was one of guarded enthusiasm. The measure was ex-
pected to provide stability for foreign steelmakers seeking to sell
in the United States, to curb at least the more flagrant unfair
competition confronting the domestic steel industry, and to re-
duce the staggering load of antidumping cases that Treasury was
processing for the steel industry. Opinions on the TPM's effec-
tiveness differed widely, however, during the two-year period
preceding its suspension in March 1980.7
3
70. See note 27 supra.
71. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 969.
72. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
73. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1980, at 105.
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The Treasury Department and, after January 1980, the
Commerce Department 4 contended that the TPM was success-
ful in deterring dumping and cited the improved health of the
domestic steel industry as the most significant indicator of the
TPM's effectiveness. Government officials dismissed the signifi-
cance of an increase in total imports and a probable increase in
technical dumping (sales of foreign steel at less than fair value)
and denied the existence of any material amount of dumping
that would qualify for action under the Antidumping Act be-
cause the vast majority of steel imports entered at prices above
the trigger price.7 5 These officials emphasized that by the end of
1978, the industry was operating at nearly ninety percent capac-
ity, employment in the industry had increased by approximately
15,000 workers, and profits were up sharply.7 6 Moreover, the
share of the domestic market captured by American producers
grew from eighty percent before TPM to eighty-seven percent
by early 1979. The government viewed any unfavorable market
conditions as reflections of international economic problems
rather than as indications of the TPM's failure. 8
The steel industry, however, whose representatives had
helped draft the TPM and which was initially enthusiastic about
the program, came to view it as a failure because it did not pre-
vent dumping. The industry believed that the trigger price was
set too low because the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, which had agreed to supply Treasury with
industry data from which the trigger price was to be computed,
had grossly underestimated Japanese costs of production. 79 Fur-
thermore, the achievements of the TPM fell far short of the re-
sults the industry had anticipated and those Treasury had
74. See note 38 supra.
75. See Note, supra note 74, at 368.
76. Address by Lynn Holec, Office of Special Programs, Dep't of Treasury, Iron &
Steel Seminar of the Financial Analysts Federation, in Cleveland, Ohio (Mar. 26, 1979),
cited in Note, The Trigger Price Mechanism: An Efficacious Enforcement of the An-
tidumping Laws?, 5 J. CORP. L. 351, 369 (1980).
77. TH EcoNoMIST, Mar. 29, 1980, at 106. It should also be noted, however, that the
market share captured by imports had returned to 18% by the end of 1979.
78, Foreign steel producers concurred with the position of the federal government:
the TPM had been successful in providing stability in the United States market. Note,
supra note 76, at 369-70.
79. When the Task Force went to Japan to investigate this allegation, they found
the Ministry's figures to be "essentially correct." Note, supra note 47, at 290.
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predicted. 0
Finally, many industry officials argued that Treasury was
not using good judgment in computing and setting the trigger
price. For example, Treasury had used an eighty-five percent op-
erating rate for the Japanese industry to compute cost of pro-
duction even though the actual rate was close to seventy per-
cent.81  Use of an inflated capacity rate resulted in an
underestimation of the unit cost of production and therefore de-
pressed the trigger price. In addition, although the trigger price
was to he adjusted each quarter based on the best current infor-
mation, Treasury limited increases on several occasions to less
than the computed value by using a "flexibility band" provision
in the TPM, which permits the Department to set the trigger
price within five percent of the actual computed increase or
decrease. 2
IV. MARCH 1980-THE CRISIS
The American steel industry's disappointment with the
TPM grew through the latter part of 1979 and the beginning of
1980 as imports of foreign steel, much of which was priced at
less than fair value, 8 captured eighteen percent of the total
American market in a period of slumping demand. The domestic
industry operated at less than its eighty percent break-even ca-
pacity,8 4 employment figures fell, 5 and, instead of providing
help to stem the flow of imports, Commerce announced no in-
crease in the trigger price for the second quarter of 1980. In re-
80. Treasury had predicted that 1978 steel imports would fall to fourteen million
tons when, in fact, twenty-one million tons were imported. Note, supra note 76, at 366.
Although imports fell slightly in early 1979, they began increasing again by the end of
the year. Id. at 369.
81. Id. at 366. Treasury justified this by use of a study suggesting that the Japanese
industry could be expected to operate over a ten-year period at eighty-five percent ca-
pacity and argued that use of the average over the longer period was appropriate to allow
for recovery of production costs by the foreign producer within a reasonable period.
82. The flexibility band was intended to "moderate price fluctuations, particularly
those due to exchange rate changes." Id. at 363 (quoting Dep't of Treasury News, Feb.
15, 1979, at 1).
83. Note, supra note 49, at 291.
84. THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 1980, at 71. In fact, by August 1980 the United States
steel industry was operating at only 54% of capacity. THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1981, at
88.
85. A 1979 peak of some 354,000 employees fell to about 276,000 by late 1980. THE
EcoNoMIsT, Oct. 4, 1980, at 71.
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sponse, the chairman of United States Steel, who had argued for
months that the administration should better protect the steel
industry against imports,"6 elected to try self-help by filing sev-
enty boxes of antidumping petitions against seven European
steel producers.87 It is doubtful that the chairman expected the
petitions to result in affirmative final determinations of dumping
and injury or that antidumping duties would ever be assessed.
Filing of the complaints was, however, expected to stem the dra-
matic increase in the flow of imports." Even if Commerce had
not suspended the TPM, the uncertainty created by the peti-
tions would probably have had significant impact on imports. Of
perhaps equal immediate significance, and even greater long-
term importance, United States Steel stood to gain substantial
bargaining power as a result of the petitions because the Gov-
ernment wanted to avoid a possible trade war between the
world's steel producers."" Furthermore, the petitions embar-
rassed the Government, which had assured major trading part-
ners that the TPM would maintain stability in the American
market. All that United States Steel stood to lose was the TPM,
a system which it believed was ineffectual.
On the same day that United States Steel filed its com-
plaints, Commerce suspended the TPM.90 The Department jus-
tified its action by stating that imports from the seven European
countries against which the petitions were filed accounted for
nearly one-third of United States imports of basic steel in 1979,
that the basis for maintaining the TPM no longer existed, and
that the Department intended to devote its resources to an ex-
peditious investigation of the alleged dumping.91 Although the
Government seemed to have little alternative to suspension of
the TPM in the face of the flood of petitions, it also stood to
improve its bargaining position by the suspension. The steel in-
dustry had little to gain by a permanent return to pre-TPM an-
tidumping procedures: the burdens of initiating petitions were
86. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1980, at 106.
87. Id. at 105.
88. Imports did drop after the petitions were filed. Total imports for 1980 fell to
15,491,000 tons compared with 17,518,000 tons in 1979. [1981] U.S. IMPoRT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 63, at A-18 (Feb. 4, 1981).
89. THE EcONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1980, at 106.
90. Id. at 105.
91. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150, Mar. 27, 1980.
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substantial, and the result too often was a negative injury deter-
mination or a foreign producer's evasive shifting of exports away
from those identified in the petition. Moreover, foreign produc-
ers were willing to bargain to get the TPM reinstated in order to
secure a stable market in the United States.
V. THE SETTLEMENT
After six months of intense and complex consultation and
negotiation, a settlement was reached.2 The Carter Administra-
tion's announcement contained, in addition to the temporary
reintroduction of the TPM, broad proposals concerning the steel
industry, labor, and affected communities. Included were liberal-
ized depreciation rules intended to increase investment and tax
credits in the form of direct cash payments to steel companies;
initiatives to foster adoption of advanced technology; a promise
of case-by-case consideration for relief from the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts; programs to help workers, their families, and
communities that included extended unemployment benefits
and funds for training assistance and economic development;
and a renewed government commitment to addressing economic
problems of the steel industry.93 To encourage modernization of
the steel industry, the TPM was reinstated with the caveat that
it would be cancelled within five years if the industry did not
show significant progress in that direction.9
The total package actually contained few binding commit-
ments. Many of the Government's proposals, such as those per-
92. [1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 46, at N-5 (Oct. 1, 1980).
93. [1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 46, at N-2 (Oct. 1, 1980).
94. [1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 46, at N-2 (Oct. 1, 1980). Foreign partic-
ipation in the negotiation and the solution primarily involved the European Community
(EC) because the petitions all affected EC members. The Carter Administration's an-
nouncement stated that assurances had been received that the EC would press forward
with an effort to restructure its steel industry. Id. at N-5. On the same day as the an-
nouncement, the office of the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) released cop-
ies of letters exchanged between USTR Reuben Askew and Viscount Etienne Davignon,
the EC's Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, in which these officials agreed that both
the American and European steel industries needed to modernize and restructure. [1980]
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 46, at A-17 (Oct. 1, 1980). In October 1980, the EC
authorized the European Commission to place compulsory limits upon steel production
within the community. The plan provided for quotas backdated to October 1, 1980 that
were aimed at reducing steel production by fourteen percent during the last quarter of
1980. THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1980, at 56.
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taining to tax and environmental matters, require congressional
approval. The settlement not only permitted United States Steel
to withdraw its petitions without prejudice but also allowed the
company to reserve the option to continue to monitor imports,
to act as it considers appropriate, and to seek an even better
package through congressional action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reintroduced TPM immediately increased stability in
the American steel market, and steel imports predictably began
to rise."5 When the Commerce Department responded with only
a nominal increase in the TPM for the first quarter of 1981,
steel executives became concerned that the mechanism would
once again fail to provide adequate protection for American
products. A 4.4% increase in the TPM during the second quar-
ter, however, prompted the Chairman of the American Iron and
Steel Institute to comment, "We are encouraged by the evident
effort which has been made by the Commerce Department to
bring trigger prices closer to the Japanese costs as we believe
them to be."96 This response illustrates that steel industry eval-
uations of the TPM may depend on the mechanism's immediate
results. A meaningful, long-range evaluation of the TPM, how-
ever, must assess its contribution to the overall health of the
steel industry. This assessment must consider the TPM as only
one part of a comprehensive program that also provides for new
sources of capital and commits the steel industry to use that
capital for modernization.9 7 Unfortunately, inflation, high inter-
est rates, increasing energy costs, and continuing government
regulation have deterred major capital investment programs.
Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration's tax program, its
commitment to a general deregulation of industry, and its inten-
tion to redirect the emphasis of antitrust enforcement to en-
courage acquisition and merger capital may improve the for-
95. The figures for the last four months of 1980 indicate a steady increase in im-
ports: 1,063,755 tons in September; 1,141,939 tons in October; 1,179,000 tons in Nov-
ember; 1,534,000 tons in December. [1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 56, at A-19
(Dec. 10, 1980); [1981] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 59, at A-13 (Jan. 7, 1981); [1981]
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 63, at A-18 (Feb. 4, 1981).
96. [1981] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 65, at A-2 (Feb. 18, 1981).
97. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 970-71; [1980] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 46, at N-2 (Oct. 1, 1980).
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tunes of the steel industry.9 8 If inflation moderates and interest
rates begin to fall,"" capital should become available and afforda-
ble not only to steel compEinies but throughout the economy.
The result would be a sharp rise in orders for basic steel and an
increase in the significance of the TPM in determining the ex-
tent to which the domestic industry can capture increasing or-
ders. If the trigger price is set at a sufficiently high level to deter
massive dumping by foreign producers, the domestic industry
could generate sufficient profits to support increased capital
investment.
Even if this optimistic scenario is realized, the question re-
mains whether industry leaders will recognize and seize the op-
portunity presented to them. The history of the steel industry
suggests that they will not. Given a climate of government coop-
eration and available capital, however, some industry leaders
have indicated that they are ready to break with history.100 If a
significant number of companies elect to take the risk, others
will be forced to follow in order to remain competitive in the
domestic market. Thus, under the proper conditions, the TPM
may become a valuable temporary device for achieving the over-
all goal of an efficient, competitive American steel industry.
Joseph Wettlin
Editor's Note: On January 11, 1982, the Department of Com-
merce again suspended the operation of the TPM in response to
antidumping complaints filed by the steel industry against
eleven foreign countries. Whether this suspension will become
permanent or will result in a negotiated settlement as in 1980
cannot be determined at this time.
98. NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1981, at 57-58.
99. See, e.g., FORBES, May 25, 1981, at 25; TImE, May 18, 1981, at 65. Interest rate
reductions are probably the most uncertain and critical of the projected improvements in
the economic climate. Reagan Administration policies seem to recognize the need for
lower interest rates but favor maintaining higher rates until other economic problems
have been solved. See High Interest, Low Spirits, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1981, at 61-62.
100. See, e.g., FORBES, Feb. 16, 1981, at 36; INLAND STEEL, ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at
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